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The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics

Note 120 — Chapter V · LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

Oswald J. (Oswald Joseph) Reichel translation

Such an inference was called λόγος· when it was expressed in definite terms, for instance, If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses (which were designated by numbers, and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ζῇ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were called λήμματα (in contrast to ἀξίωμα which expresses a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δὲ γε were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, Apollon. Synt. p. 518, Bekk.). The conclusion was ἐπιφορά, also ἐπιφορικοὶ συνδεσμοί. Ibid. 519. The major premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two clauses being called, respectively, ἡγούμενον (as by the Peripatetics) and λῆγον (by the Peripatetics ἑπόμενον). Diog. 76; Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 135; Math. viii. 301, 227; Alex. l.c. and p. 88, a; 109, a; 7, b; Philop. Anal. Pr. lx. a; Schol. in Arist. 170, a, 2; Ammon. on Anal. Pr. 24, b, 19; Arist. Orig. ed. Waitz, i. 45; Apul. Dog. Plat. iii. 279, Oud.; Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19. ↑

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