Note 115 — Chapter XIII · THE RELATION OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.

Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, inquam, Quinte, defendis. Ibid. 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censent esse suæ majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non igitur sunt Dii nee significant futura (οὐκ ἄρα εἰσὶ μὲν θεοὶ οὐ προσημαίνουσι δὲ—the well-known expression of Chrysippus for εἰ θεοί εἰσιν, οὐ προσημαίνουσι, conf. p. 114, 1); sunt autem Dii: significant ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam, frustra enim significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as belonging to Chrysippus. Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101, again reverts to the same proof. Conf. id. i. 46, 104: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab iis significantur, contemnere. Diog. vii. 149: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ᾗ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, in which case the argument would be reversed, not from providence to divination, but from divination to providence. ↑