Note 21 — Chapter XII · APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.

Chrysippus, in Plut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανὴν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. Stob. ii. 230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ’ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρήσασθαι [l. -σεσθαι] νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος προόρασιν (which, however, may not be translated as Ritter iii. 662 does ‘for the sake of advantage’; it rather refers to such cases as those mentioned by Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 17, and Plato, Rep. ii. 382, C, 389, B; iv. 459, C, in which the interests of another or of the community require deception) καὶ κατ’ ἄλλας οἰκονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλάς. In accordance with this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in Alcib. (Op. ed. Cous. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷν ἔστι δικαίως κατ’ αὐτοὺς οὔτε βιάζεσθαι οὔτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη τῶν πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξεως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The point here in dispute is simply verbal; the Stoics were, in reality, at one with Plato, in not calling permitted falsehood untruth or deceit only for the reasons quoted by Chrysippus and Stobæus. ↑