Note 1082 — Chapter II · GENERAL ADOPTION OF THE THREE-MILE LIMIT.

E.g., the case of the Leda, in which Dr Lushington claimed that the term United Kingdom included the waters to a distance of three miles from the shore (Swa., Adm., 40); General Iron Screw Company, in which Lord Hatherly said that it was “beyond question that for certain purposes every country may, by the common law of nations, legitimately exercise jurisdiction over that portion of the high seas which lies within three miles from its shores,”—whether this limit was determined by the range of cannon was not material, since it was clear it extended at any rate to that distance (1 J. and H., 180); Whitstable Fishery Case, in which it was said that the soil of the seashore to the distance of three miles from the beach was vested in the crown, and in which Lord Chelmsford observed that “the three-mile limit depends upon a rule of international law, by which every independent state is considered to have territorial property and jurisdiction in the sea which washes their coast within an assumed distance of a cannon-shot from the shore” (11 C.B. (N.S.), 387; 2 H.L.C., 192); the Annapolis, in which Dr Lushington said. “Within British jurisdiction, namely, within British territory, and at sea within three miles from the coast” (1 Lush., Adm., 306); Rex v. Forty-nine Casks of Brandy, in which Sir John Nicholl said that “as between nation and nation, the territorial right may, by a sort of tacit understanding, be extended to three miles” (3 Haggard, 257); Gammell v. Commissioners Woods and Forests and Lord Advocate, in which Lord Wensleydale referred to the distance of three miles as belonging, by the acknowledged law of nations, to the coast of the country, and “under the dominion of the country by being within cannon range, and so capable of being kept in perpetual possession” (3 MacQueen, H.L., 419).