Note 275 — Chapter XII · THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.

Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for the upádhi. The upádhi or "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, e.g., in sound itself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, while not causing audition, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.