Note 135 — Chapter IV

Amatorius, 763 C, sqq.; cf. De Placitis Philosoph., lib. i. 879-880 A. This tract cannot be quoted as authority for Plutarch’s views; it is in several places distinctly, even grossly, anti-Platonic, and in other places even more distinctly Epicurean. As an example of the reverence with which Plutarch constantly alludes to Plato, the first conversation in the Eighth Book of the Symposiacs may be quoted. The conversation arises out of a celebration of Plato’s birthday, and Plutarch gives a sympathetic report of the remarks of Mestrius Florus, who is of opinion that those who impute the philosopher’s paternity to Apollo do not dishonour the God. Cf. this and hundreds of other similar examples with the bitterly contemptuous expressions in the De Placitis, 881 A, a section which concludes with an emphatic exposition of that Epicurean view which Plutarch exerts himself so strenuously to confute in the De Sera Numinis Vindicta. Bernardakis “stars” the De Placitis, though Zimmerman quotes it as evidence against the sincerity of Plutarch’s piety (Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen, cap. 7: “aperte negat providentiam”). Wyttenbach says the De Placitis was “e perditis quibusdam germanis libris compilatum.” Christopher Meiners (Historia Doctrinæ de Vero Deo, p. 246) attacks the boldness of the writer, “quâ deorum numen et providentiam impugnavit, quæque a Plutarchi pietate et moribus longe abhorret.” Corsini seems to think that the incredible labour involved in the compilation makes it worthy of Plutarch. His edition, with notes, translation, and dissertations, makes a very handsome quarto, which is a monument of combined industry and simplicity. He makes no comment on the anti-Platonic expressions alluded to above (Corsinus: Plutarchi De Placitis Philosophorum, libri v., Florence, 1759), nor does Mahaffy either, who regards the De Placitis as genuine, though he calls it jejune. I have been unable to see a copy of Beck’s 1787 edition, which Volkmann highly praises. It may be observed with regard to the passage referred to at the head of this note that Plutarch would never have limited the contribution of philosophy to the knowledge of God to τὸ φυσικόν. Dion Chrysostom (De Dei Cognitione, 393, sqq.) mentions the same three sources of the knowledge of the Divine nature as Plutarch, but also postulates a primeval and innate cognition of God.