Note 70 — Chapter II · THE ANIMATE WORLD

Cp. with the account of Epicurus the following remarks by Gassendi (II. 248-250): ‘Epicurus probably made the atoms of the soul round: he does not seem to have said what they were so much as what they were not: Lucretius says “fugiens nil corporis aufert,” which dematerialises the concept: “ad haec memorant Plutarchus et alii Epicurum non fecisse simplicem Animae naturam sed esse voluisse κρᾶμα ἐκ τεσσάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ, ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατανομάστου ὃ ἦν αὐτῷ αἰσθητικόν[*] (Stob. Ecl. Phys. p. 798), temperatum quid ex quibusdam quattuor nempe ex quodam igneo, ex quodam aereo, ex quodam flatuoso, ex quarto quodam innominato quod ipsi est sentiendi vis”: the four mix in such a way as to produce a one (inde fiat una quaedam substantia). We see from this passage (1) that the matter is defined so as to be practically immaterial; (2) that a substance is introduced simply to explain that which the others do not explain, sentience; (3) there is no suggestion of direct perception of a soul: it is an inference, relying mainly on an induction from the data of a living and a dead body by a method of differences. The Logic of the argument is curious. It is said, a dead body is not lighter than a living body, hence the soul has no weight: a dead body does not feel, hence the soul is that which has feeling, etc. These two arguments alone would prove (1) that there was no soul, or else that it stayed in the body, and (2) that death is loss of feeling—not of a soul that feels. The assumption of the soul made these “proofs” pass muster; but it is obvious that it would change the position very little indeed if we left out the soul as it is and confined ourselves to what it does.’

[*] Gass. sic. τοῦτο δ’ ἦν Ritter et Preller 384.