Note 16 — Protocol of Peace

About this time, in Manila, there was by no means that entente cordiale which should have existed between the rebels and the Americans, supposing them to be real allies. In reality, it was only in the minds of the insurgents that there existed an alliance, which the Americans could not, with good grace, have frankly repudiated, seeing that General T. M. Anderson was frequently soliciting Aguinaldoʼs assistance and co-operation.16 Aguinaldo was naturally uneasy about the possible prospect of a protracted struggle with the Spaniards, if the Islands should revert to them; he was none the less irritated because his repeated edicts and proclamations of independence received no recognition from the Americans. General Anderson had already stated, in his reply (July 22) to a letter from Aguinaldo, that he had no authority to recognize Aguinaldoʼs assumption of dictatorship. The native swaggering soldiery, with the air of conquerors, were ever ready to rush to arms on the most trivial pretext, and became a growing menace to the peaceful inhabitants. Therefore, on October 25, Aguinaldo was again ordered to withdraw his troops still farther, to distances varying from five to eight miles off Manila, and he reluctantly complied. When this order was sent to him his forces in the neighbourhood of Manila were estimated to be as follows:—At Coloocan, 3,000 men, with two guns trained on Binondo; Santa Mesa, 380; Pasig, 400; Paco, Santa Ana, Pandácan, and Pasay, 400 to 500 each; south of Malate, 1,200, and at Santólan waterworks (on which the supply of potable water to the capital depended), 380.