Note 1 — Letter from Fajardo to Felipe III

[Marginal note: “War. What you say in these sections is reduced to three points. Firstly, the thanks that you give and should have given to our Lord for the good success of the flagship, and the same has been done here. May He be praised for all, and thus it is to be hoped, in His divine mercy, that He will be in all other events; for the just end and cause to which all is directed is His holy service and the extension of the holy Catholic faith. The second main point is of the utmost importance, and is regarding what has been written you, with the remonstrances required by the case—namely, that if the flagship and almiranta sail late, it is impossible that they can be [94] despatched early from Nueva España; and although we have written to the latter country, giving the method that is advisable to be used in that voyage and despatch, they always excuse themselves for the late sailing of the ships by the risk of vendavals, as the violence of the weather is an unavoidable difficulty. We have also written to you that the only cause of the delay is the waiting to lade those ships with the commerce of Manila—which are detained for personal ends, by awaiting the merchandise from Japon, China, and the Orient. That is poor management; and the welfare of private persons must not have more force than that of the public. For the customs duties received on departing and returning are not at all to be considered with the great danger of bad weather, in which everything is risked—especially since the only cause for the commerce between Nueva España and those islands is not the benefit of the merchants, nor the lading of Chinese cloth, but the maintenance, succor, and payment of the military and of the ministers who assist in the service and defense of that country. If you should one year cause the ships to sail on time, those at Acapulco [los terceros] would be warned by it for the future, and would understand the diligence that they must use in their despatch. It is said—and let this serve as caution and warning to you—that the chief officials who have in charge the despatch of the flagship and almiranta are those most interested, as figure-heads for third persons, in what is laded. The third point is, that when those vessels (not only of trade, but of war) sail, and since their risk of enemies is at the departure and return (but most on the return), you are advised to take warning not to let the [95] ships be so overladen that because of that they go ill equipped with seamen, and even worse defended. In conformity with this we have written to the viceroy of Nueva España; and have stated that it would be a less disadvantage to increase the number of ships than to overload those that are sent—to say nothing of the damage done to the hull of the ship by carrying so heavy a cargo. Also you are advised, on account of what you say in this section—since you say that the Dutch get help in boats, money, ammunition, food, and men in Xapon—that it would be well, since there is so continual communication between Japon and our government [in those islands], that you endeavor—through an embassy, or in any other way—to negotiate with any king of those of Xapon, or with the person who is the cause of that [aid to the Dutch], and tell them that those enemies are pirates, and that they violate the laws of nations and the public peace. Finally, since you have the matter in hand and know the importance of separating the Japanese and Dutch, you shall do this with such energy and skill as your prudence admits, doing all that you shall deem necessary and useful to attain that end.” In another hand: “A letter is being written to the viceroy of Nueva España, sending him a copy of his [i.e., Fajardo’s] clause, and what answer is made to it; and advising him, as here above stated, that an order has been given so that they shall endeavor to have the despatch of the flagship and almiranta of Filipinas attended to promptly and seasonably, as is necessary for their voyage. Accordingly he shall again issue orders to that effect, and advise us of what is done in this matter.”]1 [96]