Note 37 — Chapter XIII · WHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER—MORAL VALUATION AND FREE-WILL

That the proper subject of moral judgment is the innate character was emphasised by Schopenhauer in his prize-essays on Die Freiheit des Willens (Sämmtliche Werke, vii. 83 sqq.) and Die Grundlage der Moral (ibid. vii. 273 sqq.). The innate character, he says, that real core of the whole man, contains the germ of all his virtues and vices. And though Schopenhauer be mistaken in his statement that a person’s character always remains the same, it seems to me indisputable that the succeeding changes to which it may be subject are imputable to him only in so far as they are caused by his innate character.