Note 80 — THE MONIST. (continued 3)

A ground of mutual understanding would be supplied by accepting the distinction proposed by P. Carus between constraint, which alone excludes freedom, and necessity, which leaves our will free within the limits of our character. Already Plotinus had written: “How can it be said of this being (he who obeys his nature) that he obeys, if he is not constrained to follow something external?” (6th Enn. lib. viii.)—I recommend to the curious on these questions the book of M. Bertauld, Méthode Spiritualiste, Esprit et Liberté. M. Bertauld places freedom in autonomy, which is perfectly reconcilable with psychological determinism; there is on the contrary, he declares, no radical contradiction between determinism and free-will, and indeterminism is an absurd conception. The work is well written, and I do not intend to belittle it by mentioning it in a simple note.