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The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906

Note 172 — Chapter V

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It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported that Alfred Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and Chamberlain and Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, G.P., XIV, 193 f., No. 3779. For reports of the conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour and Chamberlain see the following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 25, 29, April 1, 1898, ibid., 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, ibid., 221 ff., No. 3793. The editors of the British Documents could find “practically no evidence” concerning this proposal in the archives of the British foreign office, and have stated that Chamberlain apparently treated the affair as private (B.D., Vol. I, Foreword). See also the dispatch from Lascelles to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, ibid., 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was uncertain about the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the different formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John Hay, who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May 13, 1898, at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in favor of that alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course came of the matter. The great affinity for the United States on the part of the British government was shown in July, 1898, by its indirect warning to Germany not to interfere in the Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251, 253). On the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich Meinecke, Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901 (München and Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, Holsteins Grosses Nein (Berlin, 1925).

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