← Table of contents
The first Moroccan crisis, 1904-1906

Note 990 — Chapter XVI

Reading edition

The German government had announced a new navy bill, which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in Le Matin insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, ibid., 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher, und Briefe (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke, however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé fall.

“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to be armed against an attack from Germany” (G.P., XXI, 75, No. 6942).

Explore with AITake your curiosity a little further.

Reading settings