Note 580 — Chapter XI

Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, ibid., 263, No. 6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, ibid., 274 f., No. 6576. It was reported in the German foreign office soon after the Anglo-French accord was made that Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je viens de rouler Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur d’Allemagne” (Guibert et Ferrette, Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905 [Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord Sanderson, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, wrote as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany entirely when he commenced operations in Morocco. The action of France and her demands on the Sultan were undoubtedly much exaggerated and misrepresented. But in addition there is no doubt that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening her alliances. The German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are extremely sensitive about being ignored or neglected in the discussion of important questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion they should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us from France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an alliance, and to obtain any share they could in the eventual development of Morocco is no doubt also true. The methods adopted were characteristic of German policy, and as on some other occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, B.D., IV, 421). Whether the German government knew the exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a question. Tardieu says that it did know them (La conf. d’Algés, p. 156). Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main content” (Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, p. 200). It also suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for the exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial division of Morocco (ibid., p. 201). See also the dispatch from Stumm to Bülow, Feb. 20, 1906, G.P., XXI, 191, No. 7024, and the Emperor’s minute thereto: “And the rascals [the Spanish government] will not even admit what sort of a pact they have made with the devil [France].” See also Veit Valentin, Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum Ende des Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, Dec. 10, 1904, Zur europ. Politik, I, 126 f. However, the German government did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office admitted to Cartwright of the British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, B.D., III, 233, No. 252). The probability is therefore that it also learned in good time the terms of the other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge or even denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive proof that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign office.