Note 949 — AMENDMENT 14 (continued 4)
Reading edition
Ibid. 105, 106, 107, 108, 118.—In a dissent, in which Justices Brandeis, Butler, and Sutherland concurred, Justice Roberts insisted that "it * * * [was] not a matter of assumption but a certainty * * * [that] * * * the * * * privilege of the accused to be present throughout his trial is of the very essence of due process," and, in that connection, "the great weight of authority is that" the view by the jury "forms part of the trial." Even if "the result would have been the same had the [accused] been present, still the denial of the constitutional right ought not to be condoned. * * * Nor ought this Court to convert the inquiry from one as to the denial of the right into one as to the prejudice suffered by the denial. To pivot affirmance on the question of the amount of harm done the accused is to beg the constitutional question involved. * * * The guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment is not that a just result shall have been obtained, but that the result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way."—Ibid. 130-131, 134, 136-137.