Note 4 — Chapter VII · The Treaty of Paris

The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a bird’s-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we should take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley cabled Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was signed, asking as to “the desirability of the several islands,” “coal and other mineral deposits,” and “in a naval and commercial sense which (of the several islands) would be most advantageous.”4 Admiral Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was “the most desirable,” but volunteered no advice. He did state, “No coal of good quality can be procured in the Philippine Islands,” which is still true. Allusion is made to this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is there set forth. On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President McKinley suggesting that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him “whether it would be better * * * to retain Luzon * * * or the whole group.” Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey before General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in writing “on general question of Philippines,” and that “his report is in your hands in response to both questions.” But the commission replied that Admiral Dewey had sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene’s and nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion from Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis’s Report (p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently, been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898, suggesting that we “interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the Islands.” No; Admiral Dewey must be acquitted of having ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy the Philippines.