Note 9 — Chapter XXI · Governor Smith—1907–9

As to the Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection of 1905, in an executive order dated September 28, 1907,9—noticed in a previous chapter, but too pertinent to be entirely omitted here—wherein are set forth the reasons for withholding executive clemency from the condemned leaders of that movement, Governor-General Smith describes in harrowing terms “a reign of terror, devastation, and ruin in three of the most beautiful provinces in the archipelago,” wrought by the condemned men, who he says “assumed the cloak of patriotism, and under the titles of ‘Defenders of the Country,’ and ‘Protectors of the People’ proceeded to inaugurate” said reign of terror. These men were most of them former insurgent officers who had remained out after the respectable generals had all surrendered. This Cavite-Batangas-Laguna insurrection was the very sort of thing which the conditional promise of a legislature made by Congress to the Filipino people in Sections 6 and 7 of the Act of July 1, 1902—the Philippine Government Act—had stipulated should not happen. This is no mere dictum of my own. In the case of Barcelon against Baker, 5 Philippine Reports, pp. 87 et seq., already very briefly noticed in a previous chapter, the Supreme Court of the Islands had, in effect, so held. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, had provided that if any state of affairs serious enough should arise, the Governor of the Philippines should have authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus “when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it.” Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act had provided, on the other hand, that if a condition of general and complete peace should prevail for a stated period the Filipinos should have a legislature. In the case of Barcelon against Baker the Supreme Court held that the situation contemplated by Section 5 of the Act of Congress had arisen in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas. That, of course, automatically, so to speak, made the postponement of the Philippine Assembly a necessary logical sequence, under the provisions of Sections 6 and 7. These Sections 6 and 7 promised the Filipinos a legislature in the event the conditions contemplated by Section 5 should not arise. Barcelon, who was one of the (non-combatant) reconcentrados restrained of his liberty at Batangas, claimed that his detention as such reconcentrado by the defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding, the constabulary officer, Colonel Baker, was unlawful, in that, he being charged with no crime, such detention deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. The Philippine Commission, however, had declared, by virtue of the authority vested in it by Section 5 of the Act of Congress aforesaid, that a state of insurrection existed in Cavite and Batangas, and accordingly the Governor-General had suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law in those provinces. The Attorney-General representing the Philippine Commission before the court rested the Government’s case on the proposition that the petitioner was not entitled to claim the ordinary “due process of law” because “open insurrection against the constituted authorities” existed in the provinces named. And the Supreme Court upheld his contention. In so holding, they say, among other things (page 93), in construing Section 5 of the Act of Congress we are considering: