Note 50 — THE SUFFOLK WITCHES[49]

Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676) was the grandson of a Gloucestershire weaver. He was educated as a Puritan and entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, in 1626. He here suddenly dropped his Puritan habits, and would have become a soldier in the Low Countries, but that, having to consult the learned Glanville as to legal proceedings taken against him which endangered his patrimony, he was persuaded to become a law student. He again resumed a quiet method of life, and owing to the slovenliness of his dress narrowly escaped being shipped to the West Indies by a press-gang. He was called in 1637, and already enjoying a considerable reputation at once acquired a lucrative practice. He devilled for Noy, but according to Campbell refused to follow him when he joined the Court party. He kept clear of politics at the beginning of the Long Parliament, though courted by both sides. He is said to have taken part in Strafford's defence; he certainly defended Laud. He took the Covenant in 1644, and sat in the Westminster Assembly of Divines. He procured honourable terms for the garrison of Oxford on the capture of that town. He took the engagement to be true to the Commonwealth in 1649, and continued to practise, often appearing for the defence in State prosecutions; particularly for the Duke of Hamilton after the battle of Worcester. He took a prominent part in the Commission appointed to reform the laws, which abolished feudal tenures and caused all legal proceedings to be conducted in English. He became a Justice of the Common Pleas in 1654, when he was occasionally brought into opposition to the government. At last he refused to try criminal causes; particularly that of Colonel Penruddock (see post, p. 59). He supported Cromwell against the sectaries. He was summoned to act as assessor to Cromwell's House of Lords; but refused to act as a judge under Richard Cromwell, though he sat in his Parliament. He sat for Gloucestershire in the Convention Parliament, and took an active part in the Restoration. He sat at the trial of the Regicides, though not at Vane's. On Bridgman becoming Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas in 1660, Hale succeeded him as Chief-Baron, his appointment being due, it is said, to Clarendon's scheme for having the Comprehension Bill, which he had drafted, defeated. He became Lord Chief-Justice in 1671, in succession to Kelyng. He has the reputation of being one of the greatest judges in English history. He settled satisfactorily all claims arising out of the rebuilding of London after the great fire; he found himself unable to help Bunyan, whom he considered to have been unjustly imprisoned, thereby, according to Campbell, being entitled to some of the credit attaching to the production of The Pilgrim's Progress. On the failure of his health he retired from the bench in 1676. It may be of interest to quote Campbell's opinion of his conduct of the present trial. 'I wish to God,' says that author, 'I could as successfully' (as he has done in Bunyan's case) 'defend the conduct of Sir Matthew Hale in a case to which I most reluctantly refer, but which I dare not, like Bishop Burnet, pass over unnoticed—I mean the famous trial before him, at Bury St. Edmunds, for witchcraft. I fostered a hope that I should have been able, by strict inquiry, to contradict, or mitigate, the hallucination under which he is generally supposed to have then laboured, and which has clouded his fame—even in some degree impairing the usefulness of that bright example of Christian piety which he has left for the edification of mankind. But I am much concerned to say, that a careful perusal of the proceedings and of the evidence shows that upon this occasion he was not only under the influence of the most vulgar credulity, but that he violated the plainest rules of justice, and that he really was the murderer of two innocent women.... Had the miserable wretches, indicted for witchcraft before Sir Matthew Hale, pleaded guilty, or specifically confessed the acts of supernatural agency imputed to them, or if there had been witnesses who had given evidence, however improbable it might be, to substantiate the offence, I should hardly have regarded the Judge with less reverence because he pronounced sentence of death upon the unhappy victims of superstition, and sent them to the stake, or the gibbet. But they resolutely persisted in asserting their innocence, and there was not only no evidence against them which ought to have weighed in the mind of any reasonable man who believed in witchcraft, but during the trial the imposture practised by the prosecutors was detected and exposed.' 'Hale's motives were most laudable; but he furnishes a memorable instance of the mischiefs originating from superstition. He was afraid of an acquittal or of a pardon, lest countenance should be given to a disbelief in witchcraft, which he considered tantamount to a disbelief in Christianity. The following Sunday he wrote a "Meditation concerning the mercy of God in preserving us from the malice and power of Evil Angels," in which he refers, with extreme complacency, to the trial over which he had presided at Bury St. Edmunds.'