Note B — Chapter XVI · — GIBRALTAR. MALAGA.

Some account of this enterprise seems to be a natural digression; and as the fullest account of the rash attempt which led to the abandonment of the enterprise, is to be found in the work of M. Bourgoing, I make no apology for transferring it to these pages. “The court of Spain, weary of the fruitless blockade of Gibraltar, which excited the ridicule of all Europe, and of the besieged themselves, seriously determined to take this fortress by some extraordinary expedient or other, against which its steepness, its formidable artillery, and all the skill of General Elliot should prove unavailing. Plans poured in from all quarters; some bold to extravagance, others so whimsical, that it was scarcely possible to look upon them as serious. Several of this kind I received myself. One of those sent to ministers, formally proposed to throw up, in front of the lines of St. Roch, a prodigious mount, higher than Gibraltar, which would consequently deprive that fortress of its principal means of defence. The author had calculated the quantity of cubic fathoms of earth, the number of hands, and the time that would be required by this enormous undertaking, and proved that it would be less expensive, and less destructive than the prolongation of the siege upon the plan on which it had been begun.

“Another proposed to fill the bombs with a substance so strongly mephitic, that on bursting in the fortress, they would either put to flight, or poison the besieged with their exhalations.

“The plan of D’Arçon was at length presented, and engaged the more serious attention of the Spanish government.

“This plan, first projected at a distance from Gibraltar, by that engineer, who, notwithstanding the issue of that famous siege, still enjoyed the reputation of a man of great talents, was afterwards matured and modified by him within sight of the fortress. But how many crosses was he doomed to experience! * * * * * * * * Scarcely any thing is known respecting it, except what relates to the ten floating batteries, which, on the 13th of September, 1782, foolishly exposed themselves to the fire of Gibraltar, and were reduced to ashes by the red-hot shot from the English batteries. This method of summing up the result of enterprises, is very convenient for indolence or malignity, but would furnish history with very erroneous elements. Enlightened by contemporary historians, her pages will inform posterity, that if this great undertaking failed, it was from a concurrence of circumstances which the genius of D’Arçon could not possibly control. One of the principal was, the hurry with which the plan was put in execution, before all the necessary preparations had been made for ensuring its success. It is well known that the ten batteries had been so constructed as to present to the fire of the fortress, one side covered with blinds three feet thick, and kept continually wet by a very ingenious contrivance. The red-hot balls were thus expected to be extinguished on the spot where they penetrated; but this first measure proved incomplete. The awkwardness of the caulkers prevented the working of the pumps, which were designed to keep up the humidity. It succeeded only on board one of them, the Talla-Piedra, and that very imperfectly. But this was not all; though the place where they were to take their stations had been but very slightly sounded, they had received instructions what course they were to pursue, in order to avoid striking, and to place themselves at a proper distance. This precaution likewise proved unavailing. Don Ventura Moreno, a brave seaman, but incapable of executing a plan, stung to the quick by a letter sent him in the evening of the 12th of September, by General Crillon, which contained this expression: ‘If you do not make an attack, you are a man without honour;’ hastened the departure of the batteries, and placed them in an order contrary to the plan which had been adopted. In consequence of this mistake, no more than two could sustain themselves at the concerted distance of two hundred fathoms. These were, the Pastora, commanded by Moreno himself, and the Talla-Piedra, on board of which, were the Prince of Nassau, and D’Arçon: but they were exposed to the fire of the most formidable battery; that of the Royal Bastion, instead of all ten being drawn up around the old mole, and receiving only sidewise the fire of that battery.

“The only two batteries which occupied this dangerous post made great havoc, and sustained dreadful loss. The Talla-Piedra received a fatal shot. In spite of all precautions, a red-hot ball penetrated to the dry part of the vessel: its effect was slow. The Talla-Piedra had opened her fire about ten in the morning; the ball struck her three and five. The mischief did not appear irremediable till midnight. The San Juan, one of her next neighbours, shared the same fate. It appears certain that the eight others remained untouched.

“But what was still more distressing, every thing was wanting at once: cables to tow off the batteries in place of accident, and boats to receive the wounded. The attack was to have been supported by ten ships, and upwards of sixty gun-boats. Neither boats, gun-boats, nor ships, made their appearance.

“Lastly, according to the projected position, the gun-boats were to have been seconded by the one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon at the lines of St. Roch. This co-operation was rendered impracticable. Near four hundred pieces of artillery were to have opened at once upon North Bastion, Montagu Bastion, and Orange Bastion. With a superiority of nearly three hundred pieces, D’Arçon flattered himself that he should be able to silence the artillery of the fortress. What was his consternation when he found that the besiegers had no more than sixty or seventy pieces, to oppose to more than two hundred and eighty belonging to the besieged.

“The combined squadron remained quiet spectators of this tremendous scene: Guichen, who commanded the French ships, sent to offer assistance to Moreno; who replied that he had no occasion for any.

“Matters continued to grow worse; and no remedy could be devised. Eight of the batteries were at too great a distance to do or to sustain much injury. The two others bore in their bosoms the elements of destruction. Moreno, despairing of being able to save any of them, and resolving that they should not fall into the hands of the English, directed that those which were already in flames should be suffered to burn, and that all the others should be set on fire. I have seen the original order to this effect. Such was the result of that day, on which were annihilated ten vessels—the masterpieces of human ingenuity—the building of which cost three millions of livres, and whose artillery, anchors, cables, rigging, &c., amounted to two millions and a half more.

“D’Arçon, in the first moment of his consternation, acknowledged that he alone was to blame for the fatal issue of the day. I had for a considerable time in my possession the original of the short, but emphatic letter, which he wrote to Montmorin the ambassador, from the very shore of Algesiras, amid the dying sound of the artillery, and by the light of the burning batteries. It was as follows: “I have burned the Temple of Ephesus; every thing is lost, and through my fault. What comforts me under my misfortune is, that the glory of the two kings remains untarnished.” But on recovering from the shock, D’Arçon wrote a learned memoir, in which he took great pains to modify the confession which had escaped him; and to prove that he had more than one partner; or rather that circumstances, the most untoward and imperious, constituted his only fault.

“Scarcely had Gibraltar foiled beneath its walls, this formidable attempt, when in sight of our armies and our squadron, the place was re-victualled by Admiral Howe, who afterwards, with his thirty-six ships, boldly entered the Mediterranean. He was seen from Buena Vista passing from one sea to the other; every spectator supposed that he was running into the jaws of destruction. The fifty-two ships which were in the bay, weighed anchor, and pursued him; but Howe baffled our endeavours, as fortune had done our plans; and returned through the Streights in the same security as he had entered them.” Such is the account given by M. Bourgoing. He had access to know the facts, and they are probably correct; but there is, evidently, a French polish over the whole detail.