Note 118 — Chapter V · THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT CONCEPT CRITICIZED
Reading edition
In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military out of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the hard line against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This, they fear, will start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote an article on the future of democratic socialism in the United States. In it he advocated some ideas which, he said, the State Department had been somewhat following for some time. Among these ideas were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will get over its “messianic intoxication.” (b) We must contain her so that she will not run the risk of the aggression that might prove a general war. (c) We must not engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit reactionaries in the buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. that we have no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back the non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will not be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of heart. See the Congressional Record, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A reprint.
This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist crusade in America should be defeated.
It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism.
It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try to see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is not large enough to precipitate a general war.