Note 53 — SECTION XII. THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS IN ENGLAND AND ON THE CONTINENT.
Reading edition
In the Report of May 3, 1882, made by Sir H. Barron to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) (part 4 of the “Reports by Her Majesty’s Secretaries of Embassy and Legation on Manufactures, Commerce, &c.,”) on the subject of the Belgian Budget, the former stated that “The 5 years from 1876 each closed with a deficit rising in 1881 to 6¼ million francs (£250,000), the main explanation being the ever-increasing burden thrown on the Treasury by the extension of the railway, which undertaking has ceased to cover its charges and completely disturbed the financial equilibrium of the State. The first lines constructed and worked by the State, being great trunk lines, gave every year an increasing return which enriched the Treasury. To these were first added conceded lines, which had to be purchased from companies at high prices; then secondary lines, whose traffic was unremunerative. After many previous experiments, the accounts of the railway have been since 1878 drawn up on a new and presumedly more accurate principle. The Treasury is now considered as the bankers of the railway; it is assumed that all funds advanced by the former are chargeable with an interest of 4 per cent., and repayable within ninety years. According to this new method of book-keeping, it appears that the railway contributed largely to the revenue until 1872 inclusively, but that since that year it has, on the contrary, entailed an annual loss. Thus, the deficit of 1881 is for the greater part (4,861,725 fr.) due to the insufficiency of the railway revenue. Fortunately Belgium has a resource at hand.”
“The Minister of Finance in the debate on the Budget of Public Works, points to that resource in the following pregnant words: It is proved that the railway fails to cover its charges by about five millions (£200,000). We are informed that this year the deficiency may be seven millions; in 1883, possibly even ten millions. What will it be in 1884? No one knows, but the progression is ascending. Must we follow it without counting the cost? Must we raise the tariffs or throw on the Treasury the burden caused by the insufficiency of the railway receipts? Either the railway must be worked on a principle which shall allow it to cover its charges or the taxpayers must make up the difference.”
He further added that in his report of 1876 he recommended “a raising of the tariff.” Sir H. Barron goes on to state “that the inferior productiveness of the Belgian Railway was due to the inadequate tariff, which, for passengers and merchandise, was much lower than those prevailing in the rest of Europe.” He further remarks, however, that “notwithstanding all this it has been held that the experiment is a great success, and bears evidence in favour of State ownership, because, as the railway is worked in the interest of trade, &c., it is considered that the benefit thus indirectly accruing to the public at large, is greater than that which might be realised by aiming at a commercial profit for the direct and immediate benefit of the taxpayers.”
The construction of railways in Belgium has, no doubt, developed the commerce and industry of the country to a remarkable extent. It was stated by Sir Bernhard Samuelson (page 9 of Report) that the receipts of railways had increased from £1,815,000 in 1870 to £4,880,000 in 1883, or 168 per cent.; but he omitted to point out that the length of the railways had increased by more than 250 per cent.
See the observation of M. Leon Say as to the tendency to reduce railway tariffs to an unremunerative point when the State is the owner.—Le Rachat des Chemins de Fer, Journal des Economistes, 1881, p. 343.