Note 233 — Chapter I · ASPECTS OF THE LIBIDO
Beatrice M. Hinkle translation
From the good proceed desire and joy—joy having reference to some present good, and desire to some future one—but joy and desire depend upon the opinion of good; as desire being inflamed and provoked is carried on eagerly toward what has the appearance of good, and joy is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary—wherefore as soon as anything that has the appearance of good presents itself, nature incites us to endeavor to obtain it. Now where this strong desire is consistent and founded on prudence, it is by the stoics called Bulesis and the name which we give it is volition, and this they allow to none but their wise men, and define it thus; volition is a reasonable desire; but whatever is incited too violently in opposition to reason, that is a lust or an unbridled desire which is discoverable in all fools.—The Tusculan Disputation, Cicero, page 403.