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Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 2

Note A3-7-7 — Chapter III

John J. (John Joseph) Lalor translation

How much more convenient it is for the statesman, when he does not need to give any thought to the education of industry, is shown, especially by the great difficulty of striking precisely the proper height of a protective tariff. If too low, it fails of its object; and so, likewise, if too high; because then, in a very unpedagogical way, it lulls one into a lazy security. And how impossible it is to make the tariff vary with every variation in the cost of production, in price, etc.; as List desired it should, not, however, without a good deal of variation in his own views. (Roscher, Gesch. der N. O., II, 989 seq.) How greatly would not List have been obliged to limit his assumptions, if he had lived to see the universal exposition of 1862, at which English connoisseurs expressed their pleasure that England had not remained behind France and Germany in locomotive building? (Ausland, 19 Oct., 1862.) Hence Schäffle opposes all protective duties as an educational measure, because the "protected" classes, by means of diets (Landtage), newspapers, etc. so greatly influence legislation; that is, the educator is influenced by the pupil! (System, 409 ff.) The usual calculation of the cost for home undertakers (Unternehmer) can always only strike the average, and hence it is too high for some and too low for others. (Rau, Lehrbuch, II, § 214.) It frequently occurs that large manufacturers already existing desire a low protective tariff to facilitate their competition with foreign countries, possible even without such tariff, but not high enough to encourage others to compete with them at home.

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