Note 102 — Chapter XXXII · PHILEBUS.
Reading edition
Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. οἱ τοῦτο ἡγύμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥ τις φρόνησις, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι … ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι· φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ, τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα.
In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposion, pp. 199 C, 204 C.
When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to φρόνησις absolutely (without specifying φρόνησις of what), we are surprised to see that it is not even mentioned in the Philêbus.