Note 32 — Chapter XXXI · KRATYLUS.
Reading edition
Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv. p. 6: “Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer Zeiten,” &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., part ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Gesch. Gr. Röm. Phil., part ii. sect. cvii. p. 285.
Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum, p. 4, says: “Quod mirum est non esse ab iis animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de linguæ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia atque singula pro philosophi decretis venditarint, ideoque ei absurdissima quæque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius.… Nec Tiedemannus Argum, Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irrisionem primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann.” &c. Stallbaum, moreover, is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the Etymological Lexicons adopt Plato’s derivations as genuine. Ménage (ad Diogen. Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus to be ψευδέτυμα, but never hints at the supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the centuries between Plato and Ménage, men had become more critical on the subject of etymology: in the century after Ménage, they had become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot on the etymologies of Ménage himself.
The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article ‘Etymologie’ (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot’s collected works, vol. iii. p. 33): “Ménage est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggère la malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il est très vrai qu’il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité ne soit justifiée par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvé qu’en multipliant à volonté les altérations intermédiaires, soit dans le son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot quelconque de tout autre mot donné: c’est le moyen d’expliquer tout, et dès-lors de ne rien expliquer; c’est le moyen aussi de justifier tous les mépris de l’ignorance.”
Steinhart (Einleitung zum Kratylus, pp. 551-552) agrees with Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended to mock and caricature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet also that parts of the Kratylus are seriously intended. And he declares it almost impossible to draw a line between the serious matter and the caricature.
It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato from the charge of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening upon him another intellectual defect quite as serious.
Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cratylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended to destroy it — “hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverâ infringit” (p. 12). Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided, understands nothing of this acerbissima irrisio (p. 18). He thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).