Note 18 — Chapter XXXI · KRATYLUS.

Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. — 423 D: οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι; … Τί οὖν; εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο, ἑκάστου τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; Compare p. 433.

The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying bread. Psammetichus was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first of mankind.

This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when M. Renan says that the assumption is the same “as Plato has developed with so much subtlety in the Kratylus,” I do not agree with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by the technical Lawgiver, is something very different. See M. Renan, De l’Origine du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146, 2nd ed.