Note 39 — Chapter XXVII · PARMENIDES.

Aristotel. Metaphys. Δ. 1015-1016, I. 1052, a. 29 seq. τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἓν ἢ συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἷς ᾖ· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις μία, &c.

About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John Stuart Mill’s ‘System of Logic,’ i. 2, 4, p. 30, edit. 5th. “When only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name — as visibleness, tangibleness, equality, &c. — though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is always considered as one, not as many.” Compare, also, on this point, p. 153, and a note added by Mr. Mill to the fifth edition, p. 203, in reply to Mr. Herbert Spencer. The oneness of the attribute, in different subjects, is not conceded by every one. Mr. Spencer thinks that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in Subject A, and another attribute, though exactly like it, in Subject B (Principles of Psychology, p. 126 seq.) Mr. Mill’s view appears the correct one; but the distinction (pointed out by Archbishop Whately) between undistinguishable likeness and positive identity, becomes in these cases imperceptible or forgotten.

Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the Categories ranks ἡ τίς γραμματικὴ as ἄτομον καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ (pp. 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand; and it seems opposed to another passage, pp. 3, 6, 15.

The argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer, illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of this question respecting the One and the Many, under certain supposable circumstances. We cannot be surprised that it puzzled the dialecticians of the Platonic Aristotelian age, who fastened by preference on points of metaphysical difficulty.