Note 150 — Chapter XXIII · PROTAGORAS. (continued 2)
Reading edition
See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-Röm., Phil. Part ii. sect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag. pp. 15-33-34.
So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765) “Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. Neque affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur. De hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi,” &c.
When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by Sokrates in the Protagoras, whether it be consistent or not with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony with the other two.