Note 22 — Chapter XX · LYSIS.

Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter Plato runs into a confusion between τὸ διά τι and τὸ ἕνεκά του, which two he began by carefully distinguishing. Thus in 218 D he says, ὁ φίλος ἐστὶ τῳ φίλος — ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι. Again 219 A, he says — τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἰατρικῆς φίλον ἐστίν, διὰ τὴν νόσον, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγιείας. This is a very clear and important distinction.

It is continued in 220 D — ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τἀγαθὸν ἠγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς φάρμακον ὂν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν νόσμα. But in 220 E — τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοὐναντίον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὃν ἑχθροῦ ἕνεκα. To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before, these two last words ought to be exchanged for διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved — διὰ τὸ κακόν, not ἕνεκα τοῦ κακοῦ. Good is loved on account of evil, but for the sake of obtaining a remedy to or cessation of the evil.

Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Müller’s translation of Plato, p. 268) calls this a “sophistisches Räthselspiel”; and he notes other portions of the dialogue which “remind us of the deceptive tricks of the Sophists” (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see p. 222-224-227-230). He praises Plato here for his “fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the Sophists”. Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word φίλος, he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man Menexenus. The confusion between ἕνεκά του and διά τι (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists. I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato’s reasoning.