Note 51 — Chapter XIII · HIPPIAS MAJOR — HIPPIAS MINOR.
Reading edition
Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16): —
“Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by absolute or original, is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind.… Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c.”
The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.