Note 100 — Chapter VIII · PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY.

Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. “Plato (he observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question, he proposes, in propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy (ironically said) purpose of correcting in their minds the false persuasion of knowledge.” (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon Schrift. p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous, but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any of Plato’s writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. “The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question discussed.”

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere (Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70) — That the Platonic Ideenlehre was altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἄμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, &c.