Note 129 — Chapter III · * OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

Aristotle (Met. Δ. 1024) represents the doctrine of Antisthenes, That contradictory and false propositions are impossible — as a consequence deduced from the position laid down — That no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way: “There are many contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is different from the subject, there is nothing in the form of a proposition to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish Theætêtus sedet, from Theætêtus volat — to take the instance in the Platonic Sophistês — p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to give τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον τοῦ πράγματος.” There would be nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it silly εὐηθῶς), because, while shutting out falsehood and contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of communication.

Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes — “Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges — die Wesenheit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften” (this is rather too Aristotelian) — “zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen”. Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the Kratylus, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, Krat. pp. 429-430).