Note 3 — Chapter I · GENERAL DIVISION OF LIFE.[1]

This distinction of the two lives is bad, inasmuch as it tends to separate phenomena which have a very intimate connexion, which relate to a common object, and which are often produced by means in every respect similar. Why should I rank among the organs of animal life the muscular apparatus which carries the alimentary mass from the mouth into the oesophagus, and among those of the other life, that which takes it from the cardiac orifice to the anus? Is not the action of the first apparatus in relation with nutrition as well as the action of the last, and does not the muscular apparatus of the oesophagus act upon a body which is foreign to us, as well as that of the tongue and the pharynx? Do the motions of mastication differ in their object from those of which we have just spoken, and as to the means of execution, does not the muscular action still perform the principal part?

We might in the same way bring near each other the motions by means of which we seize our food. The action itself of the senses, which directs these motions, is, with nutrition, in a relation more remote, but not less necessary, and we see in the various classes of animals that their apparatus is modified according to the different kinds of nourishment. If the distinction of the two lives be wanting in justice, as to the object of the functions it separates, we shall soon see that the characters attached to the organs of one and the other do not establish this division in a more striking manner.