Note 2 — Chapter IV · LORD KITCHENER'S TASK
Reading edition
Critics of the present Government, such as the editor of the National Review, have maintained that Lord Kitchener was forced upon an unwilling Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion; that although he was in England throughout the crisis he was allowed to make all his preparations for returning to Egypt, and was only fetched back as he was on the point of stepping aboard the packet; that the well-known form of Lord Haldane had been seen at the War Office, and that if the Lord Chancellor had, as was intended, relinquished his legal position in order to become Secretary of State for War, we should probably not have sent abroad our Expeditionary Force. It is undeniable that during Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) London was buzzing with a strange rumour (which was fathered altogether falsely upon the French Ambassador) that France did not ask for or require our assistance on land; but only at sea. If this were so the absurdity of sending our Expeditionary Force would have been obvious. It is noteworthy that a usually well-inspired section of the Ministerial Press—even after they had reluctantly accepted war as inevitable—were still maintaining stoutly, even so late as Tuesday and Wednesday (4th and 5th), that the Expeditionary Force should not be allowed to cross the channel. Lord Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, and the Expeditionary Force began to go abroad the following week. The chapter of English political history which begins with the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends with the appointment of Lord Kitchener on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove to be one of the most interesting in our annals. Whether it will prove to be one of the most glorious or one of the most humiliating exhibitions of British statesmanship we cannot say until we possess fuller knowledge than we do at present of the attitude of ministers at the Cabinets of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, August 1 and 2).