Note a — OCELLUS LUCANUS ON LAWS. A FRAGMENT PRESERVED BY STOBÆUS, ECLOG. PHYS. LIB. I. CAP. 16.

Page 1.—“But others from opinion in conjunction with reason;”—which in the original is, τα δε και δοξῃ, μετα λογου. But Ocellus is not accurate in what he here asserts, as is evident from what Plato says in his Timæus. For the divine philosopher having, in the former part of this dialogue, proposed to consider “what that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated [or consists in becoming to be], but is never [really] being,” adds: “The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness; but the latter is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.” Τι το ον μεν αει, γενεσιν δε ουκ εχον· και τι το γιγνομενον μεν, ον δε ουδεποτε· το μεν δη, νοησει μετα λογου περιληπτον, αει κατα ταυτα ον· το δ’αυ δοξῃ μετ’ αισθησεως αλογου, δοξαστον, γιγνομενον και απολλυμενον, οντως δε ουδεποτε ον. Plato, as is evident from what is said in the Introduction to this work, had seen this tract of Ocellus, and corrects him in what he here says, as he also did the opinions of other philosophers anterior to, or contemporary with him. For if Ocellus had spoken accurately, he should have said, “that he had learnt some things through clear arguments from nature herself, but others from opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.” For, as Proclus admirably demonstrates in his Commentary on the above passage from the Timæus of Plato, truly existing being is only to be apprehended by us through illuminations from an intellect superior to the human, in conjunction with the energy of the summit of our reasoning power; for such is the accurate meaning of λογος in this place. But opinion is a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason, yet without being able to assign the cause of what it knows; and sense is an irrational knowledge of the objects to which it is passive, and the instrument of sense is passion only. See the first volume of my translation of the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato, p. 202, &c.