Note 99 — Chapter VII
Reading edition
The report of these proceedings by Sir James Burrow would in some measure justify this observation of Walpole, for there seems from it to have been much coquetting between the Bench and the Attorney-General (De Grey), and an apparent desire by each to shift the responsibility upon the shoulders of the other. In delivering judgment upon the two cross motions then before the Court, viz. that of the Attorney-General for Wilkes’s committal, and that of Serjeant Glynn that Wilkes should be admitted to bail, Lord Mansfield makes this remarkable admission:—“I have no doubt we might take notice of him upon his voluntary appearance as the person outlawed and commit or bail him, but we are not absolutely bound to do it without some reason to excuse the going out of the regular course.” And in reference to the conduct of the Attorney-General he thus expresses himself, “I don’t see why the Attorney-General should demand of the Court to commit the defendant upon the outlawry, when he himself has suffered him to go at large without any attempt to take him up, or even issuing process against him.” (Rex v. Wilkes,—Burrow’s Reports, vol. iv. p. 2531–5.)—E.