Note 21 — MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE, EXILE, AND CONVERSATIONS, OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. (continued 6)

The determination to surrender had been far from unanimous in the garrison. Opinions were divided on this point. Some were for returning to France by means of a capitulation, which course was adopted; others were in favour of an enterprise of a much bolder nature. This was nothing less than to quit Dresden, with the chosen troops of the garrison, to descend the Elbe by successively raising the blockade of Torgau, where there were 28,000 men; of Wittemberg, where there were 5000; of Magdeburg, where there were 20,000, and to proceed to Hamburg where there were 32,000. The army thus collected together, which would have amounted to 60 or 80,000 men, was to repair to France, cutting a passage through the enemy’s ranks, or compelling him to retrograde by manœuvring on his rear; while the levies in mass that might have advanced to assail our veteran bands would have been paralyzed. And even had this plan failed, the issue was not likely to be more fatal than the capitulation. This opinion was warmly advocated by the Count de Lobau, Generals Teste, Mouton-Duvernet, and others. The design was grand, worthy of our glory, and quite in harmony with our past acts. It was the Emperor’s intention to carry it into effect, and for this purpose he issued orders, which, however, did not reach the place of their destination. The despair occasioned by the thought of surrendering was such that a portion of the troops urged the officer who was at the head of the opposing party to take the command upon himself. Respect for discipline at length prevailed over enthusiasm; but the officer above alluded to expressed himself in the most violent way in the council. It is said that, in his indignation, he exclaimed to the General-in-chief;—“The Emperor will tell me that, pistol in hand, I ought to have taken the command upon myself.“