Note Back to Main Text — Chapter XII

With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses should be taken—to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting, and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of accepting the British terms, Accepting the inevitable. each of them was anxious, individually, to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute—for every man was preparing himself for the bitter end—they came to an agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6 votes.