Note Footnote 3: — Chapter III

It is, however, only through observation of what is open to the senses that science can reach the underlying conditions, and, therefore, to understand its methods we must consider generally what is open to observation in causal succession. What can be observed when phenomena follow one another as cause and effect, that is, when the one happens in consequence of the happening of the other? In Hume's theory, which Mill formally adopted with a modification,3 there is nothing observable but the constancy or invariability of the connexion. When we say that Fire burns, there is nothing to be observed except that a certain sensation invariably follows upon close proximity to fire. But this holds good only if our observation is arbitrarily limited to the facts enounced in the expression. If this theory were sound, science would be confined to the observation of empirical laws. But that there is something wrong with it becomes apparent when we reflect that it has been ascertained beyond doubt that in many observed changes, and presumably in all, there is a transference of energy from one form to another. The paralogism really lies in the assumption from which Hume deduced his theory, namely, that every idea is a copy of some impression. As a matter of fact, we have ideas that are not copies of any one impression, but a binding together, colligation, or intellection of several impressions. Psychological analysis shows us that even when we say that things exist with certain qualities, we are expressing not single impressions or mental phenomena, but supposed causes and conditions of such, noumena in short, which connect our recollections of many separate impressions and expectations of more.