Note 249 — Chapter XIV · POSSESSION (Continued).

Bruns rejects the definition of possession as consisting in the continuing exercise of a right, and defines it as the continuous possibility of exercising a right at will. “Just as corporeal possession,” he says (Recht des Besitzes, p. 475) “consists not in actual dealing with the thing, but only in the power of dealing with it at will, so incorporeal possession consists not in the actual exercise of a right, but in the power of exercising it at will; and it is only because the existence of this power does not become visible as an objective fact until actual exercise of the right has taken place, that such actual exercise is recognised as an essential condition of the commencement of possession.” This however seems incorrect. Possession consists not in the power of exercising a claim in the future, but in the power of continuing to exercise it from now onwards.