Note 1 — Chapter XVI
Reading edition
St. Cyr (p. 50) reproaches the English for this, and says, ‘Nous n’avions jamais espéré prendre à la vue, et sous le canon de l’escadre, une garnison forte encore d’environ 3000 hommes. Il aurait été possible aux Anglais, en plein jour, et sur-tout facile durant la nuit, d’embarquer la garnison, et de la transporter, en quelques heures, sur la rive droite de la Fluvia, en laissant seulement un faible detachement pour remettre la forteresse; comme cela s’était pratiqué, en Février, 1795, quand une escadre Espagnole occupait la baie.’ But in that siege the enemy were not masters of the town, and they had now established a battery in it to cut off the communication between the citadel and the ships, which was done so effectually, that five days before the surrender Captain Bennett found it impossible to land a single messenger there. M. St. Cyr adds, that when the prisoners defiled along the shore the English ships opened a brisk fire upon them, and that the Spaniards would never be persuaded that this was done in mistake. The Marshal was not upon the spot himself; if he had, this statement would not have appeared in his Journal.