Note 315 — Chapter IX
Reading edition
To question 64, p. 6 (Committee, 1834) “Would there be any political or other advantages in our opening the line of the Euphrates?” Mr. Peacock replies: “I think it would be highly serviceable, if possible, to prevent Russia pre-occupying it and excluding us; it would be exceedingly easy for Russia to follow the steps of Trajan and Julian, construct fleets in Armenia, and float them to Bussorah; they have the possession, at least the command, of the Armenian part of the Euphrates now.”
“Would there not (question 65) be more danger to be apprehended from the Russians from their making use of the Oxus and Caspian, than by making use of Bussorah, where they would be met by the nation which happens to have the pre-eminence at sea?”—“But the pre-eminence at sea,” Mr. Peacock replies, “is not a talisman; it is to be kept up by constant watchfulness, and the exertion of adequate force. I know there is danger by the Oxus, but there is also danger by the Euphrates, and I would stop both doors, if I could.” In reply to further questions (66) he says: “The first thing the Russians do, when they get possession of, or connection with, any country, is to exclude all other countries from navigating its waters;” and in reply (question 67) to “How the establishment of steam along the Euphrates would serve in any respect to counteract Russia?” he says, “It would give us a vested interest and a right to interfere;” adding “they (the Russians) have been long supposed to have designs on Baghdad; they have had emissaries there a good while; the Pashalic of Baghdad is a very valuable possession, and would pay for protecting it, either to them or to us.”
Mr. William J. Bankes (and others) entertained similar opinions. In reply to (question 2626) “What is your opinion of the political advantages between the one and the other?” he says, “It is very much in favour of the Euphrates.” “Will you state in what respect?” (question 2627) “I think by anticipating the Russian, you will exclude him; I think he will afterwards, perhaps, do that by force which you could now, perhaps, do by treaty.”