Note 91 — Chapter XLVII · FROM THE THIRTY YEARS’ TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a government of dependencies; Athens, as an imperial state, exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two governments, one supreme, the other subordinate, and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other, has always been found a problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume of Mr. G. C. Lewis (Essay on the Government of Dependencies), and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this matter which are set forth therein, will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will, most certainly, stand full comparison with the government of England, over dependencies, in the last century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal laws against the Catholics; by the Declaration of Independence, published in 1776, by the American colonies, setting forth the grounds of their separation; and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Mr. Lewis (p. 367), elucidates, farther, two points not unimportant on the present occasion: 1. The illiberal and humiliating vein of sentiment which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the dependency against oppression by English officers.

“An action was brought, in the court of Common Pleas, in 1773, by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General Mostyn, the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned him, and transported him to Spain, without any form of trial, on the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for redress of grievances, in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff’s behavior was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff with £3,000 damages. In the following term, an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the whole court.

“The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn, on this trial, contain a plain and naïve statement of the doctrine, that a dependency is to be governed, not for its own interest, but for that of the dominant state. ‘Gentlemen of the jury,’ said the counsel, ‘it will be time for me now to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English, and to the English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English, whom they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, he is, or chooses to be called, the patriot of Minorca. Now patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but little to value, and we should have but little of what we now enjoy, were it not for our trade. And for the sake of our trade, it is not fit that we should encourage patriotism in Minorca; for it is there destructive of our trade, and there is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. But here it is very well; for the body of the people in this country will have it: they have demanded it,—and in consequence of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will transmit to their posterity,—and it is not in the power of this government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves free in our plantations.’”

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury, shows the strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against misconduct of Athenian trierarchs, or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above cited would also often find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly; and it would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two governments, one supreme and the other subordinate. They are not the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the Athenian democracy, as Mr. Mitford and so many others have sought to prove.