Note 683 — Chapter XLVI · CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

Arist. Polit. iv, 5, 6. ἔτι δ’ οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, etc.; compare vi, 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected by Periklês, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to be characterized as “dissolving or extinguishing magisterial authority.” On the contrary, it is conformable to the best modern notions. Periklês cannot be censured for having effected this separation, however persons may think that the judicature which he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi, p. 767)—πάντα ἄρχοντα ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναι τίνων—an opinion, doubtless, perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered absolutely complete.