Note 712 — Chapter VI · LAWS AND DISCIPLINE OF LYKURGUS AT SPARTA. (continued 2)

The view of Dr. Thirlwall agrees, in the main, with that of Manso and O. Müller (Manso, Sparta, vol. i. pp. 118-128; and vol. ii. Beilage, 9, p. 129; and Müller, History of the Dorians, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 10, sect. 2, 3).

Both these authors maintain the proposition stated by Plutarch (Agis c. 5, in his reference to the ephor Epitadeus, and the new law carried by that ephor), that the number of Spartan lots, nearly equal and rigorously indivisible, remained with little or no change from the time of the original division, down to the return of Lysander, after his victorious close of the Peloponnesian war. Both acknowledge that they cannot understand by what regulations this long unalterability, so improbable in itself, was maintained: but both affirm the fact positively. The period will be more than four hundred years if the original division be referred to Lykurgus: more than three hundred years, if the nine thousand lots are understood to date from the Messenian war.

If this alleged fact be really a fact, it is something almost without a parallel in the history of mankind: and before we consent to believe it, we ought at least to be satisfied that there is considerable show of positive evidence in its favor, and not much against it. But on examining Manso and Müller, it will be seen that not only is there very slender evidence in its favor,—there is a decided balance of evidence against it.

The evidence produced to prove the indivisibility of the Spartan lot, is a passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, c. 2 (ad. calc. Cragii, p. 504), πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται,—τῆς ἀρχαίας μοίρας ἀνανέμεσθαι (or νενεμῆσθαι) οὐδὲν ἔξεστι. The first portion of this assertion is confirmed by, and probably borrowed from, Aristotle, who says the same thing, nearly in the same words: the second portion of the sentence ought, according to all reasonable rules of construction, to be understood with reference to the first part; that is, to the sale of the original lot. “To sell land, is held disgraceful among the Lacedæmonians, nor is it permitted to sever off any portion of the original lot,” i. e. for sale. Herakleidês is not here speaking of the law of succession to property at Lacedæmon, nor can we infer from his words that the whole lot was transmitted entire to one son. No evidence except this very irrelevant sentence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.

Having thus determined the indivisible transmission of lots to one son of a family, Manso and Müller presume, without any proof, that that son must be the eldest: and Müller proceeds to state something equally unsupported by proof: “The extent of his rights, however, was perhaps no farther than that he was considered master of the house and property; while the other members of the family had an equal right to the enjoyment of it.... The master of the family was, therefore, obliged to contribute for all these to the syssitia, without which contribution no one was admitted.”—pp. 199, 200.

All this is completely gratuitous, and will be found to produce as many difficulties in one way as it removes in another.

The next law as to the transmission of property, which Manso states to have prevailed, is, that all daughters were to marry without receiving any dowry,—the case of a sole daughter is here excepted. For this proposition he cites Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 227; Justin, iii. 3; Ælian. V. H. vi. 6. These authors do certainly affirm, that there was such a regulation, and both Plutarch and Justin assign reasons for it, real or supposed. “Lykurgus, being asked why he directed that maidens should be married without dowry, answered,—In order that maidens of poor families might not remain unmarried, and that character and virtue might be exclusively attended to in the choice of a wife.” The same general reason is given by Justin. Now the reason here given for the prohibition of dowry, goes, indirectly, to prove that there existed no such law of general succession, as that which had been before stated, namely, the sacred indivisibility of the primitive lot. For had this latter been recognized, the reason would have been obvious why daughters could receive no dowry; the father’s whole landed property (and a Spartan could have little of any other property, since he never acquired anything by industry) was under the strictest entail to his eldest son. Plutarch and Justin, therefore, while in their statement as to the matter of fact, they warrant Manso in affirming the prohibition of dowry (about this matter of fact, more presently), do, by the reason which they give, discountenance his former supposition as to the indivisibility of the primitive family lots.

Thirdly, Manso understands Aristotle (Polit. ii. 6, 11), by the use of the adverb νῦν, to affirm something respecting his own time specially, and to imply at the same time that the ancient custom had been the reverse. I cannot think that the adverb, as Aristotle uses it in that passage, bears out such a construction: νῦν δὲ, there, does not signify present time as opposed to past, but the antithesis between the actual custom and that which Aristotle pronounces to be expedient. Aristotle gives no indication of being aware that any material change had taken place in the laws of succession at Sparta: this is one circumstance, for which both Manso and Müller, who both believe in the extraordinary revolution caused by the permissive law of the ephor Epitadeus, censure him.

Three other positions are laid down by Manso about the laws of property at Sparta. 1. A man might give away or bequeathe his land to whomsoever he pleased. 2. But none except childless persons could do this. 3. They could only give or bequeathe it to citizens who had no land of their own. Of these three regulations, the first is distinctly affirmed by Aristotle, and may be relied upon: the second is a restriction not noticed by Aristotle, and supported by no proof except that which arises out of the story of the ephor Epitadeus, who is said to have been unable to disinherit his son without causing a new law to be passed: the third is a pure fancy.

So much for the positive evidence, on the faith of which Manso and Müller affirm the startling fact, that the lots of land in Sparta remained distinct, indivisible, and unchanged in number, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. I venture to say that such positive evidence is far too weak to sustain an affirmation in itself so improbable, even if there were no evidence on the other side for contradiction. But in this case there is powerful contradictory evidence.

First, the assertions of these authors are distinctly in the teeth of Aristotle, whose authority they try to invalidate, by saying that he spoke altogether with reference to his own time at Sparta, and that he misconceived the primitive Lykurgean constitution. Now this might form a reasonable ground of presumption against the competency of Aristotle, if the witnesses produced on the other side were older than he. But it so happens, that every one of the witnesses produced by Manso and Müller, are younger than Aristotle: Herakleidês Ponticus, Plutarch, Justin, Ælian, etc. Nor is it shown that these authors copied from any source earlier than Aristotle,—for his testimony cannot be contradicted by any inferences drawn from Herodotus, Thucydidês, Xenophon, Plato, Isokratês, or Ephorus. None of these writers, anterior to, or contemporary with, Aristotle, countenance the fancy of equal, indivisible, perpetual lots, or prohibition of dowry.

The fact is, that Aristotle is not only our best witness, but also our oldest witness, respecting the laws of property in the Spartan commonwealth. I could have wished, indeed, that earlier testimonies had existed, and I admit that even the most sagacious observer of 340-330 B. C. is liable to mistake when he speaks of one or two centuries before. But if Aristotle is to be discredited on the ground of late date, what are we to say to Plutarch? To insist on the intellectual eminence of Aristotle would be superfluous: and on this subject he is a witness the more valuable, as he had made careful, laborious, and personal inquiries into the Grecian governments generally, and that of Sparta among them,—the great point de mire for ancient speculative politicians.

Now the statements of Aristotle, distinctly exclude the idea of equal, indivisible, inalienable, perpetual lots,—and prohibition of dowry. He particularly notices the habit of giving very large dowries, and the constant tendency of the lots of land to become consolidated in fewer and fewer hands. He tells us nothing upon the subject which is not perfectly consistent, intelligible, and uncontradicted by any known statements belonging to his own, or to earlier times. But the reason why men refuse to believe him, and either set aside or explain away his evidence, is, that they sit down to the study with their minds full of the division of landed property ascribed to Lykurgus by Plutarch. I willingly concede that, on this occasion, we have to choose between Plutarch and Aristotle. We cannot reconcile them except by arbitrary suppositions, every one of which breaks up the simplicity, beauty, and symmetry of Plutarch’s agrarian idea,—and every one of which still leaves the perpetuity of the original lots unexplained. And I have no hesitation in preferring the authority of Aristotle (which is in perfect consonance with what we indirectly gather from other authors, his contemporaries and predecessors) as a better witness on every ground; rejecting the statement of Plutarch, and rejecting it altogether, with all its consequences.

But the authority of Aristotle is not the only argument which may be urged to refute this supposition that the distinct Spartan lots remained unaltered in number down to the time of Lysander. For if the number of distinct lots remained undiminished, the number of citizens cannot have greatly diminished. Now the conspiracy of Kinadôn falls during the life of Lysander, within the first ten years after the close of the Peloponnesian war: and in the account which Xenophon gives of that conspiracy, the paucity of the number of citizens is brought out in the clearest and most emphatic manner. And this must be before the time when the new law of Epitadeus is said to have passed, at least before that law can have had room to produce any sensible effects. If, then, the ancient nine thousand lots still remained all separate, without either consolidation or subdivision, how are we to account for the small number of citizens at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadôn?

This examination of the evidence, for the purpose of which I have been compelled to prolong the present note, shows—1. That the hypothesis of indivisible, inalienable lots, maintained for a long period in undiminished number at Sparta, is not only sustained by the very minimum of affirmative evidence, but is contradicted by very good negative evidence. 2. That the hypothesis which represents dowries to daughters as being prohibited by law, is, indeed, affirmed by Plutarch, Ælian, and Justin, but is contradicted by the better authority of Aristotle.

The recent edition of Herakleidês Ponticus, published by Schneidewin, in 1847, since my first edition, presents an amended text, which completely bears out my interpretation. His text, derived from a fuller comparison of existing MSS., as well as from better critical judgment (see his Prolegg. c. iii. p. liv.), stands—Πωλεῖν δὲ γὴν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται· τῆς δὲ ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν (p. 7). It is plain that all this passage relates to sale of land, and not to testation, or succession, or division. Thus much negatively is certain, and Schneidewin remarks in his note (p. 53) that it contradicts Müller, Hermann, and Schömann,—adding, that the distinction drawn is, between land inherited from the original family lots, and land otherwise acquired, by donation, bequest, etc. Sale of the former was absolutely illegal: sale of the latter was discreditable, yet not absolutely illegal. Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 6, 10) takes no notice of any such distinction, between land inherited from the primitive lots, and land otherwise acquired. Nor was there, perhaps, any well-defined line of distinction, in a country of unwritten customs, like Sparta, between what was simply disgraceful and what was positively illegal. Schneidewin, in his note, however, assumes the original equality of the lots as certain in itself, and as being the cause of the prohibition: neither of which appears to me true.

I speak of this confused compilation still under the name of Herakleidês Ponticus, by which it is commonly known: though Schneidewin, in the second chapter of his Prolegomena, has shown sufficient reason for believing that there is no authority for connecting it with the name of Herakleidês. He tries to establish the work as consisting of Excerpta from the lost treatise of Aristotle’s περὶ Πολιτειῶν: which is well made out with regard to some parts, but not enough to justify his inference as to the whole. The article, wherein Welcker vindicates the ascribing of the work to an Excerptor of Herakleidês, is unsatisfactory (Kleine Schriften, p. 451).

Beyond this irrelevant passage of Herakleidês Ponticus, no farther evidence is produced by Müller and Manso to justify their positive assertion, that the Spartan lot of land was indivisible in respect to inheritance.