Note 714 — Chapter V

‘No kind of reasoning can give rise to a new idea, such as this of power is; but wherever we reason, we must antecedently be possessed of clear ideas, which may be the objects of our reasoning.’ Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. i. p. 217. Compare vol. ii. p. 276, on our arriving at a knowledge of causes ‘by a kind of taste or fancy.’ Hence, the larger view preceding the smaller, and being essentially independent of it, will constantly contradict it; and he complains, for instance, that ‘difficulties, which seem unsurmountable in theory, are easily got over in practice.’ vol. ii. p. 357; and again, in vol. iii. p. 326, on the effort needed to ‘reconcile reason to experience.’ But, after all, it is rather by a careful study of his works, than by quoting particular passages, that his method can be understood. In the two sentences, however, just cited, the reader will see that theory and reason represent the larger view; while practice and experience represent the smaller.