Note 38 — Chapter I

Mr. Hallam (Lit. of Europe, vol. ii. p. 29) says, that his scepticism ‘is not displayed in religion.’ But if we use the word ‘religion’ in its ordinary sense, as connected with dogma, it is evident, from Montaigne's language, that he was a sceptic, and an unflinching one too. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that all religious opinions are the result of custom: ‘Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses.’ Essais de Montaigne, p. 121, livre i. chap. xxx. As a natural consequence, he lays down that religious error is not criminal, p. 53; compare p. 28. See also how he notices the usurpations of the theological spirit, pp. 116, 508, 528. The fact seems to be, that Montaigne, while recognizing abstractedly the existence of religious truths, doubted our capacity for knowing them; that is to say, he doubted if, out of the immense number of religious opinions, there were any means of ascertaining which were accurate. His observations on miracles (pp. 541, 653, 654, 675) illustrate the character of his mind; and what he says on prophetic visions is quoted and confirmed by Pinel, in his profound work Aliénation Mentale, p. 256. Compare Maury, Légendes Pieuses, p. 268 note.