Note 242 — Chapter I · (continued 2)

Dr. Whewell, for instance, says, that we must reject final causes in the inorganic sciences, but must recognize them in the organic ones; which, in other words, simply means, that we know less of the organic world than of the inorganic, and that because we know less, we are to believe more; for here, as everywhere else, the smaller the science the greater the superstition. Whewell's Philos. of the Inductive Sciences, 8vo., 1847, vol. i. pp. 620, 627, 628; and his Hist. of the Induc. Sciences, vol. iii. pp. 430, 431. If the question were to be decided by authority, it would be enough to appeal to Bacon and Descartes, the two greatest writers on the philosophy of method in the seventeenth century; and to Auguste Comte, who is admitted by the few persons who have mastered his Philosophie Positive, to be the greatest in our own time. These profound and comprehensive thinkers have all rejected the study of final causes, which, as they have clearly seen, is a theological invasion of scientific rights. On the injury which this study has wrought, and on the check it has given to the advance of our knowledge, see Robin et Verdeil, Chimie Anat. Paris, 1853, vol. i. pp. 489, 493, 494, vol. ii. p. 555; Renouard, Hist. de la Médecine, vol. i. pp. 232, 237; Sprengel, Hist. de la Médecine, vol. ii. p. 220; Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Hist. des Anomalies de l'Organisation, vol. iii. pp. 435, 436; Herder, Ideen zur Gesch. der Menschheit, vol. iii. p. 270; Lawrence's Lectures on Man, p. 36; and Burdach, Traité de Physiologie, vol. i. p. 190.