Note 321 — Chapter V · THE MORALITY OF CARD-PLAYING.

It may be observed, that such cases of "Natural Equity," as are here hypothetically put by Barbeyrac, do not properly admit of a third party as a judge, in the event of a dispute. Parties entering into such contracts, irrespective of the usages of society, or the positive laws of the country where they reside, ought to be left to enforce their natural equity by natural means. One wealthy fool loses to another the whole of his property, the contract between them being, that he was to be the winner who should draw the longest straw out of a stack. In natural equity, between the two parties, the loser is obliged to pay; but, should he recover his senses, he will refuse, and leave the winner to his remedy; for the circumstance of his risking so much in the first instance, was a greater offence against society than his subsequent refusal to pay. What one gambler may lose to another is of small moment to society, compared with the primary evil through which such persons are enabled to play deeply with the fruits of others' labours. Luther, speaking of the lawfulness of retaining money won by gaming, concludes that it might be lawfully retained; but adds, that he could wish both parties to lose, if it were possible. The impossibility has been removed since regular gaming houses and gaming banks were established.