Note 57 — Chapter V

The gallant and talented author of the “History of the Peninsular War” has fallen into some slight topographical errors (caused, probably, by the extraordinary inaccuracy of the Spanish maps) in describing the movements of the contending armies. He describes, for instance, the French as obliging the Duke of Albuquerque to abandon his position at Carmona (where he had hoped to cover both Seville and Cadiz), by moving from Ecija upon Utrera (i.e. in rear of the Spanish army), along “a road by Moron, shorter” than that leading to the same place through Carmona. But so far from this road by Moron being “shorter,” it is yet more circuitous than the chaussée; and, moreover, by skirting the foot of the Ronda mountains, it is both bad and hilly.

He furthermore represents the Duke of Albuquerque as falling back from Utrera upon Xeres, with all possible speed, and, nevertheless, taking Lebrija in his way, which town is, at least, eight miles out of the direct road. A French account (La Pène, Campagne de 1810) says, the Spanish army fell back from Carmona “par le chemin le plus direct, Utrera et Arcos sur Xeres,"—an error equally glaring, for the chaussée is the shortest road from Utrera to Xeres;—in fact, it is as direct as a road can well be, and leaves Arcos some twelve miles on the left! We may suppose, in attempting to reconcile these discrepant accounts, that the main body of the duke’s army retreated from Utrera to Xeres by the chaussée; the cavalry by Arcos, to cover its right flank during the march; and that the road by Lebrija was taken by the troops withdrawn from Seville, as being the most direct route from that city to Xeres.